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ABSTRACT 
Nonlinear filter generators are common components used in the keystream generators 
for stream ciphers and more recently for authentication mechanisms. They consist of 
a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and a nonlinear Boolean function to mask 
the linearity of the LFSR output. Properties of the output of a nonlinear filter are not 
well studied. Anderson noted that the m-tuple output of a nonlinear filter with 
consecutive taps to the filter function is unevenly distributed. Current designs use taps 
which are not consecutive. We examine m-tuple outputs from nonlinear filter 
generators constructed using various LFSRs and Boolean functions for both 
consecutive and uneven (full positive difference sets where possible) tap positions. 
The investigation reveals that in both cases, the m-tuple output is not uniform. 
However, consecutive tap positions result in a more biased distribution than uneven 
tap positions, with some m-tuples not occurring at all. These biased distributions 
indicate a potential flaw that could be exploited for cryptanalysis. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) are commonly used to 
produce sequences for cryptographic purposes. For example, they may be 
used as components of the keystream generator in a stream cipher. The 
theory regarding the properties of LFSR sequences is well known. The 
research presented in this paper focuses on the sequences produced by 
binary LFSRs, where each stage of the shift register contains a single bit. 
 
If the feedback polynomial of the LFSR is primitive, the binary 
sequence produced has several properties which are useful for cryptographic 
applications. Firstly, the sequence has a known period: provided the initial 
state is non-zero, a LFSR of length  with primitive feedback polynomial 
produces a binary sequence of length 2   1. Thus a large period can be 
guaranteed by choosing an appropriate value for L. Secondly; the sequence 
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has some good statistical properties. The distribution of all -tuple patterns, 
for     	1,2, . . .  is almost uniform. For example, when   1, one 
period of the LFSR output sequence contains 2 ones, and 2   1 
zeroes. When   2 if we consider one period of the LFSR output sequence 
as a series of overlapping two bit patterns, each of the two-bit patterns 01, 10 
and 11 occurs 2 times, and the pattern 00 occurs 2   1 times. 
Similarly, in one period of the LFSR output sequence, each -bit pattern 
occurs 2 times, except for the all-zero -bit pattern which occurs 
2   1 times. The distribution of -tuple patterns in random sequences 
is expected to be uniform. 
 
Although LFSR sequences have many desirable properties, using the 
LFSR output sequence directly as keystream is not advisable due to the 
linearity of LFSR sequences. To make use of the desirable properties of the 
LFSR in a keystream generator for a stream cipher, it is necessary to 
introduce nonlinearity. A simple method is to use the contents of several 
stages of the LFSR as inputs to a nonlinear Boolean function, and use the 
output of the function as the keystream. The nonlinear Boolean function is 
referred to as a filter function, and keystream generators based on a single 
LFSR and a nonlinear combining functions are known as nonlinear filter 
generators (NLFG). A diagram of a NLFG is shown in Figure. The NLFG 
aims to make use of the good properties of the underlying LFSR, so it is 
worthwhile examining the NLFG output sequence to determine which of the 
desirable properties of the LFSR sequence are maintained in the NLFG 
output sequence. The period of the NLFG keystream sequence is known to 
be  2   1  (the same as the underlying LFSR sequence) if the LFSR 
feedback function is primitive and of degree L and the nonlinear filter 
function is balanced (Simpson, 2000). For most cryptographic purposes, a 
balanced filter function is used as a balanced output sequence is required.  
 
A balanced filter function applied to the stages of a LFSR with 
primitive feedback function and non-zero initial state results in an output 
keystream where the difference between the number of zeroes and the 
number of ones occurring in one period of the keystream sequences is 
exactly one, that is, close to uniform. Much less is known about the 
frequency distribution of -bit patterns in the NLFG output sequence 
for    1. An early paper by Anderson (Anderson, 1994) discusses the 
distribution of -bit patterns in the NLFG output sequence in the context of 
a correlation attack on the NLFG. Anderson considers that the common 
NLFG correlation attack strategy, which regards the keystream as a series of 
individual bits, discards information about the nonlinear structure of the 
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filter function. Instead, for a given -input Boolean filter function, he 
defines an augmented function which maps a (2  1)-bit input to an -bit 
output. Essentially this is applying the -input filter function  times in 
succession, assuming that the inputs to the filter function are from 
consecutive positions of the underlying sequence, although this is not stated 
explicitly in the paper. For the augmented function Anderson examined, the 
-bit pattern distributions are clearly biased. For a particular Boolean 
function, certain -tuples do not occur as outputs at all. This function was a 
bent function, which, due to its unbalanced nature, is not suitable as the filter 
function for a nonlinear filter generator. However, it was not clear whether 
distributions with non-occurring m-tuples are possible when balanced 
functions are used. Furthermore, the relationship between the characteristics 
of the Boolean filter function and the degree of bias in the output is not 
revealed.  
 
 
Figure 1: Nonlinear Filter Generator 
 
To provide resistance to guess-and-determine style attacks, NLFG-
style designs now commonly take the inputs to the filter from positions in 
the LFSR which are not consecutive, ideally tap positions which form a full 
positive difference set. The effect of this change in the positions of the input 
stages of the -tuple pattern distribution of the NLFG output sequence 
warrants further investigation.  
 
This paper presents the results of an investigation into the distribution 
of -bit patterns in NLFG output sequences. This extends the earlier work 
of Anderson, where the value of  was used as both the number of inputs to 
the filter function and the length of the bit patterns examined in the NLFG 
output sequence. We make a clear distinction between these two parameters. 
We denote the number of inputs to the filter function by , and consider the 
distribution of -bit patterns in the NLFG output sequence for  
 	1,2, . . . . We examine the output sequence of NLFGs constructed using 
various LFSRs and balanced nonlinear Boolean functions. In additional, we 
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investigate both the case where the inputs to the filter function are from 
consecutive LFSR stages and the case where the inputs are non-consecutive 
from irregularly selected stages (full positive difference sets where possible).  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we 
describe our experimental design. In Section 3, the results of our 
experiments are described. In Section 4, we discuss the possible implications 
of our findings on the use of outputs of nonlinear filters for cryptographic 
purposes. Section 5 concludes this paper and proposes some future work.   
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
There are two main components of a NLFG, the LFSR and the 
nonlinear Boolean function. The goal of our experiments was to determine 
how these components affect the output sequence of the NLFG. We examine 
how choices in length and feedback polynomials for the LFSR and tap-
settings to a nonlinear Boolean function affect the distribution of -tuple 
outputs of the keystream sequence. In order to accurately determine the -
tuple distribution, it is necessary to produce an entire period of the 
keystream sequence. This constrained the length of the LFSRs used in our 
experiments. LFSR of length , for  ranging from 13 to 20 bits, were 
chosen in our experiments. The primitive feedback polynomials chosen are 
given in Table 1. 
 
TABLE 1: LFSR feedback polynomial 
 
LFSR feedback polynomial LFSR feedback polynomial 
L1:        
 1 
L2:               1 
L3:      
    1 
L4:      1 
L5:        
 1 
L6:               1  
L7:        
 1 
L8:                  
          1 
L9:      
    1 
L10:                 
      1 
 
Three balanced Boolean functions, F1, F2 and F3 were chosen for 
use as nonlinear filters. All three appear in the cryptographic literature. F1 is 
a 5-bit Boolean function used in the Grain stream cipher (Hell, Johansson, & 
Meier, 2005). F2 is a 6-bit Boolean function obtained from a report by 
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Faugère & Ars (Faugère & Ars, 2003). F3 is a 7-bit Boolean function used 
in Pomraranch (Jansen, Helleseth, & Kolosha, 2005).  The algebraic normal 
forms of these nonlinear Boolean functions are: 
 
F1: 2   5   14   34   45   123   134 
 135   235   345 
F2: 123   236   12   34   56   4    5 
F3: ANF omitted due to size. The truth table of the Boolean function can be 
obtained from Jansen, Helleseth, & Kolosha (2005). 
 
Relevant characteristics of these three Boolean functions, namely the 
algebraic degree, nonlinearity and correlation immunity are shown in Table 
2. 
 
TABLE 2: Characteristics of the Boolean functions 
 
Function Algebraic degree Nonlinearity Correlation 
immunity 
F1 3 12 1 
F2 3 24 0 
F3 4 56 2 
 
For each of the feedback polynomials, three different sets of tap 
settings for the Boolean functions were chosen. One set of tap settings used 
consecutive taps from the LFSR and two sets used uneven (or FPDS where 
possible) taps from the LFSR. In the uneven tap settings scenario, two sets 
of tap settings were used. These are denoted T1 and T2 in Table 3. 
 
TABLE 3: Tap settings used in our experiments. 
 
LFSR 5-bit Boolean function 6-bit Boolean function 7-bit Boolean function 
T1 T2 T1 T2 T1 T2 
L1 0,1,4,8,12 0,1,3,7,12 0,1,2,5,9,12 0,2,5,7,10,12 0,1,3,5,9,11,12 0,2,3,5,8,10,12 
L2 
L3 0,1,4,9,14 0,4,6,13,14 0,1,4,8,10,14 0,2,3,10,13,14 0,1,4,5,10,13,14 0,2,3,7,9,11,14 
L4 
L5 0,1,3,11,15 0,1,5,11,15 0,1,4,8,13,15 0,3,7,8,11,15 0,1,3,6,10,12,15 0,2,3,7,10,13,15 
L6 
L7 0,3,8,13,17 0,2,5,9,17 0,2,3,8,15,17 0,1,4,10,12,17 0,1,3,9,11,14,17 0,2,8,9,12,15,17 
L8 
L9 0,1,3,7,19 0,2,7,9,19 0,1,3,7,12,19 0,1,4,11,13,19 0,1,3,8,11,17,19 0,3,5,9,10,14,19 
L10 
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For each LFSR, nonlinear filter function and tap setting combination, 
the NLFG was run to generate a sequence 2    –  1 in length. The 
frequency distribution of m-tuples was calculated for  = 2 to 13. From this, 
the -tuple which occurs least and most frequently for -tuples of sizes 2 
to 13 were noted. The standard deviation is a useful summary measure for 
the m-tuple distribution of a sequence. The smaller the standard deviation, 
the closer the m-tuple distribution of the sequence is to a uniform 
distribution. To enable comparisons where different size LFSR are used, the 
proportions of all m-tuples which have a specific value is calculated and the 
standard deviation of the proportion is also calculated. Recall the m-tuple 
distribution for the maximal length sequence produced by a LFSR is almost 
uniform. For example, the 3-tuple distribution for a 15-bit LFSR L3 with the 
nonlinear filter function F1 is given in Table 4. Clearly, from this table, the 
distribution is far from uniform. This is shown by the large standard 
deviation and chi-square value. 
 
TABLE 4: 3-tuple distribution of a NLFG sequence. 
 
m-
tuple 
Expected 
no. of 
occurrences 
Observed 
number of 
occurrences 
Standard 
Deviation 
Proportion of 
all 3-tuples 
Standard 
Deviation of 
proportion of 
all 3-tuples 
Goodness-
of-fit test 
value 
000 4095 2815  
 
 
768.208 
0.023438  
 
 
0.023445 
 
 
 
1152.098 
001  
 
 4096 
 
4352 0.132818 
010 4864 0.148442 
011 4352 0.132818 
100 4352 0.132818 
101 4864 0.148442 
110 4352 0.132818 
111 2816 0.085940 
 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our experiments involved 90 NLFGs, comprising of different 
LFSRs, Boolean functions and tap settings. A sequence of length 2 
  –  1 bits for each NLFG was generated and the output sequence was 
examined for -tuples for values of  ranging from 2 to 13 bits. We make a 
number of observations based on the results of our experiment. The factors 
which could impact on the -tuple distribution include the positions of the 
inputs to the filter functions, the number of inputs to the filter function, and 
the length and feedback function of the LFSR. 
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Observation 3.1: The m-tuple distribution of NLFG output sequences is 
generally non-uniform. 
 
Note that our observation supports the earlier findings by Anderson. We also 
note that the degree of non-uniformity varies depending on the combination 
of LFSR feedback function, the nonlinear filter functions and positions of 
input taps to the filter function. There are a few cases when the m-tuple 
output of the NLFG was uniform for smaller m-tuple values. For example, 
the 3-tuple distribution for a NLFG using the L5, F1 and T1 combination 
had the m-tuple distribution expected of a maximal length sequence. 
However, as  increased, the distribution became less uniform. Close to 
uniform distribution were more frequent when  #  4 and when uneven tap 
settings were used. With the exception of one case when    5, all m-
tuple distributions when    4 were not uniform for NLFGs which used 
uneven tap settings. The almost uniform m-tuple distribution never occurred 
for consecutive tap settings for all m-tuples tested. 
 
Observation 3.2: The m-tuple distribution is less uniform when tap settings 
are consecutive. 
 
When comparing the m-tuple distribution for the output sequences obtained 
from NLFGs with the same LFSR and filter function but with different 
positions in the LFSR selected for inputs to the filter function, the 
distributions when the tap settings are consecutive are more varied than 
when the tap settings are uneven.  For example, in the case for a 3-tuple 
distribution of a NLFG using the feedback function L3 with consecutive tap 
settings and the F1 as the nonlinear filter, the least frequent 3-tuple occurred 
2815 times and the most frequent 3-tuple occurred 4864 times. The standard 
deviation obtained was 320.057. When the same feedback function and filter 
function was used in a NLFG with uneven tap setting T1, the least frequent 
3-tuple occurred 3520 times and the most frequent 3-tuple occurred 4672 
times. The standard deviation obtained 133.982. For the same LFSR and 
nonlinear filter with the uneven tap setting T2, the minimum obtained was 
4095 and the maximum obtained was 4096 and the standard deviation 
obtained 0.331. This trend was apparent for every NLFG sequence 
examined.  
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Observation 3.3: For some NLFGs with balanced Boolean functions, some 
m-tuples do not occur. 
 
It is possible that particular m-tuples may not appear in a NLFG output 
sequence. In our experiments, we noted that this can occur when the 
nonlinear Boolean functions are balanced. The number of different -tuples 
which do not appear in the output sequence is higher for NLFGs using 
consecutive tap settings than when uneven tap settings are used. For 
example, a NLFG using the feedback function L1, F2 Boolean function and 
the consecutive tap settings has 20 non-occurring 10-bit tuples.  In contrast, 
a NLFG using the same feedback function and Boolean function with the T1 
tap setting has only three non-occurring 10-bit tuples. As the -tuple size 
increases, the number of non-occurring -tuples also increases for uneven 
tap settings.  
 
We also noted from our experiments that, for a given choice of filter 
function and tap setting, as the size of the LFSR increased, the number of -
tuples which do not appear in the output sequence remained constant once a 
certain size was reached for the LFSRs we tested. For example, there were 
17 non-occurring 10-bit -tuples for a 6-input Boolean function when  $
15 to 20.  
 
Observation 3.4: Distribution of -tuples for NLFGs using consecutive tap 
settings are similar regardless of the size of the LFSR. 
 
The distributions of the proportions of m-tuples for NLFGs using 
consecutive tap settings were similar regardless of the size of the LFSR. 
However, this was not the case for uneven tap settings. For NLFGs using 
uneven tap settings, the standard deviation of the -tuples in terms of 
proportions are different for different LFSR lengths, tap settings and 
Boolean functions. 
  
 
DISCUSSION 
In this section, we consider the potential impact of biased m-tuple 
distributions in the output sequences from NLFGs. These sequences are used 
keystream for stream ciphers, in initialisation functions and as building 
blocks for message authentication codes (MAC). 
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Some stream ciphers use the output of NLFGs as keystream to 
encrypt messages. There is a potential major flaw in this design choice if the 
NLFG has a highly biased m-tuple distribution. Firstly, there is a possibility 
of mounting a distinguishing attack on the keystream. If an attacker were to 
perform a statistical analysis on the -tuple outputs, they might be able to 
mount a distinguishing attack based on the frequency of the various -
tuples in the keystream. Another possible attack is a ciphertext-only attack 
on the stream cipher. Biased m-tuple distribution combined with the 
redundancy of the plaintext may provide leakage of information to allow an 
attack to partially decrypt ciphertext messages without initial knowledge of 
the secret key. An example of an attack which exploits biased eight-tuple 
distributions in RC4 is the ciphertext-only attack by Mantin and Shamir 
(2001). 
 
Modern stream ciphers use a secret key and a publicly known 
initialisation vector (IV) as input to an initialisation function to generate the 
initial state of the keystream generator. This initialisation function should be 
nonlinear. A potential problem with using the output of a nonlinear filter for 
initialisation is that if -tuples occur more often than others, then it is 
possible that some initial states will occur more often than others, resulting 
in biased keystream distribution. In the case where some -tuples do not 
occur at all, this means some initial states might not occur at all for any key-
iv pair, reducing the effective key space of the stream cipher. 
 
In recent years, stream cipher designers have proposed ciphers which 
aim to provide simultaneous confidentiality and integrity protection. These 
are commonly called authenticated encryption (AE) stream ciphers. Some 
AE stream ciphers use nonlinear filter generators in components used to 
compute the Message Authentication Code (MAC) tag. One example of 
such a cipher is Sfinks (Braeken et al., 2005). For MAC algorithms which 
make use of nonlinear filters, the distribution of MAC tags for messages 
may not be uniform. An attacker may be able to exploit this in a MAC 
collision attack. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we examined the output of various NLFGs and 
analysed the distribution of -tuples in the output sequence for  
	2,3, … ,13 . We show that the -tuple distributions of NLFGs are biased, 
regardless of tap settings used, although the bias is generally greater when 
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the tap settings to the filter function are consecutive. In some cases, there are 
some -tuples which do not occur at all in the outputs. This happens for 
small -values if the NLFGs use consecutive tap settings rather than uneven 
tap settings. The experiments also show that the frequency distributions of 
m-tuples for NLFGs using consecutive tap settings are similar regardless of 
the size of the LFSR. 
 The findings in this experiment may have cryptanalytic applications. 
The significant m-tuple bias in the output sequence may be exploited in 
attacks ranging from distinguishing attacks to ciphertext-alone attacks. If a 
NLFG is to be used in a cryptographic application, we recommend against 
consecutive tap settings. 
  
A limitation of the work is the use of only three balanced Boolean 
functions of input sizes 5, 6 and 7 bits. This makes it difficult to draw 
conclusions about the effect of the Boolean function itself on the -tuple 
distributions of NLFG output sequences. Further experiments investigating 
the -tuple distribution of NLFG sequences formed using Boolean 
functions with the same number of inputs but with different nonlinearity or 
algebraic degree remains future work. 
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